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Abstract: A review of two recent books on the history of voting 
participation in America displays some of the conceptual and 
methodological advances as well as some of the frailties which are 
characteristic of the "new political history." After summarizing the 
explanations which Bumbarn and Kleppner offer for the collapse of 
northern white turnout in the early part of the twentieth century, its 
partial revival during the 1930s, and its decline since 1960, I 
evaluate the theories and methods they use in order to determine how 
well-founded their conclusions are. Adopting a rational choice­
inspired standpoint rather than their sociological approaches suggests 
interpretations of the early twentieth century and 1960-1980 changes 
which are somewhat at variance with theirs. 
VOTERS, ABSENT AND PRESENT: A REVIEW ESSAY 
Walter Dean Burnham, The Current Crisis iB A@erican Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), 322 pp., hardcover, $29.95, softcover, $?; 
Paul Kleppner, Rh!! Voted? � Dynamics .Q.f Electoral Turnout, 1870-1980 
(New York: Praeger, 1982) , 206 pp., hardcover, $? 
Conventional political historians tell colorful stories of 
particular politicians or election campaigns or analyze the appeals of 
what they claim are the underlying ideologies of groups or of eras. 
Basing their accounts on the impressions of interested observers as 
recorded in letters and newspapers, they usually shun open and self­
conscious theorizing and straightforward, falsifiable conclusions, and 
they pay scant attention to election returns, legislative roll calls, 
or other quantifiable data, Social scientific political historians, on 
the other hand, specify their assumptions and models, focus more on 
countable than on "lettristic" evidence, examine electoral systems or 
Strings of elections, and aim to generalize. For traditionalists, 
questions about trends in voting turnout simply do not arise, The 
publication of these two books demonstrates both how much the newer 
approach has changed the research agenda of political history and how 
important questions of turnout have become, The first is a collection 
of overlapping, provocative essays published since 1965 by the 
political scientist who has contributed more than any other to the 
invigoration of American electoral history, while the second, which is 
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by one of the most prolific end serious of the new breed, is the most 
comprehensive survey of the history of American voting participation 
yet published, 
Both Burnham and Kleppner concentrate on the same major changes in 
voter participation--the decline in non-southern turnout after 1896, 
its partial recovery after 1930, and its relapse after 1960, (Burnham 
views the South as a deviant case, while Kleppner's excellent treatment 
of southern developments is peripheral to his main concerns.) Both 
offer similar explanations. From 1840 to 1900, which Kleppner terms 
"the era of citizen mobilization, " the parties mirrored ethnocultural 
cleavages between the "psychologically isolated communities" which 
composed northern society (Kleppner, p.47), Since politics at the 
local level "resonated emotionally" (Kleppner, P• 71) with group 
identity, turnout soared and remained high, despite the facts that 
national issues were largely irrelevant and that economic policies at 
all governmental levels were of minimal importance in the voter's 
calculus, Although voters had substantially fewer years of schooling 
than they do today and were much less likely to live in urban areas 
(both traits which correlate strongly and positively with turnout in 
current surveys) , a much higher percentage of them voted regularly in 
both presidential and non-presidential years. Partly because non­
official ballots were distributed by the political parties, the 
electorate split their tickets much less and voted for candidates for 
every office on the ballot much more than they do in the twentieth 
century. 
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The acceptance of cultural pluralism by William McKinley and the 
nomination of the pietistic William Jennings Bryan by the previously 
liturgical Democrats in 1896 untied the parties from their 
ethnoreligious moorings. No class-based parties succeeded them because 
of Americans' acceptance of the Lockean liberal capitalist consensus 
(Burnham, following his former teacher Louis Hartz); because of the 
"reforms" of the "Progressive Era", such as nonpartisan local elections 
and nominations by primary, which reduced the importance of parties; 
and because of the adoption of personal voting registration, which made 
the act of voting more burdensome. Since no viable socialist 
alternative emerged, since no other line of cleavage neatly divided the 
capitalist parties, and since the Republicans usually easily defeated 
the Democrats in the North, those in the age cohorts that entered the 
electorate after 1900 participated at much lower levels than their 
older counterparts, especially if the newly eligible voters were 
working class, female, or foreign-born. Although ethnic and religious 
rivalries continued to be expressed in politics, they did not neatly 
coincide with party divisions. (Burnham makes an exception for the 
Smith-Hoover contest, while Kleppner pointedly ignores the 1928 
election. Neither cites Allan Lichtman's Prejudice and the Old 
Politics.) 
Joining already active Republicans who switched to the Democrats, 
many previously nonvoting members of the working class surged into the 
electorate to punish the party of Hoover and to reward FDR's move in 
the "second New Deal" to more genuinely pro-labor and redistributive 
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policies. Nonetheless, voter registration laws, enacted earlier, 
presented the full mobilization of the working class (Kleppner), and 
the historic tendency to keep policy within consensual bounds 
forestalled a party split purely on class lines (Burnham), 
After 1960, both parties, but especially the Democrats, were 
disrupted by the rise of such issues as civil rights, Vietnam, and 
abortion, which did not divide the electorate along the same lines as 
did the partial class cleavage of the New Deal party alignment; by the 
increasing tendency of nominees at all levels to run campaigns 
independent of the party structures; by changes in the rules of 
nominating systems which increased the influence of ideologues at the 
expense of traditional elected pragmatists; and by the growing 
importance of interest groups--Burnham (p.154) calls it 
"hyperpluralism"--which offered people a means to affect policies of 
particular concern to them instead of sending politicians more diffuse 
messages through the ballot box, 
As partisan decomposition in the electorate proceeded and as the 
number of incumbent-protecting "collusive gerrymanders" increased, 
outcomes in Congressional districts became both less competitive seat 
by seat and less uniform across all seats and party loyalty in Congress 
decreased. These developments, in turn, reduced the informative value 
of the partisan cue to both legislators and voters, which further 
diminished the importance of the parties, and so on. (Burnham, pp,215-
19.) Potential voters, especially those who came of age after 1960 and 
those who were unrepresented by strong organizations, found politics 
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increasingly difficult to make sense of, parties less and less 
relevant, and their own efforts to determine policy through voting 
increasingly inefficacious. Consequently, more abstained, particularly 
working class voters and the young. 
In European countries for which comparable data is available, 
there are only slight differences in turnout between those in high and 
low status occupations, the well and poorly educated, the young, 
middle-aged, and old. In the U,S,, on the other hand, gaps in 
participation between these groups are currently very large and they 
have grown markedly since 1960, a result, Burnham believes, of the 
Democratic party's move from the left towards the center of this 
country's narrow political spectrum. (Burnham, 124, 152, 184, 188-89,) 
When no revitalizing "critical realignment" occurred, American 
politics, with its crumbling parties and its increasingly alienated 
voters, entered what Burnham pontifically terms a "conjunctural 
crisis," which is part of a "general crisis of capitalism," (pp , 230, 
243, 260,) The older, more affluent electorate which remained gave us a 
government which reduced rich people's taxes and spent money chiefly on 
care for the old and dying and on preparations for Armageddon. 
Burnham and Kleppner both reject the implicit claims of the 
dominant "Michigan School" of electoral behavior that the 41llerican 
Voter's generalizations hold for all democracies for all time and that 
survey research is always the best evidence with which to validate 
empirical political theories. Pouring over aggregate data, historical 
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as well as contemporary, for other countries as well as America, 
Burnham has stimulated students of American politics not so much by 
challenging the fundamental concepts of Ann Arbor as by throwing doubt 
upon the stability of the model's parameters. Along with Kleppner, he 
accepts the view that party identification is of crucial importance, 
that the electorate can usefully be divided into "core," "marginal," 
and "nonvoting" groups on the basis of their degree and regularity of 
participation, and that most voters have little knowledge about or 
comprehension of the political world. What they doubt is that the 
influence of parties l!£!. ,!_@, over and above the groups they represent, 
has always been the same as it is now; that the proportions of the core 
and marginal components of the electorate and the correlates of those 
components with other social groupings have remained constant; and that 
politics has mattered as little to the average voter as some Michigan 
scholars have claimed that it does today. 
Yet it may be useful for political historians to question the 
Michigan orthodoxy more basically, as many political scientists already 
have, In current surveys, how distinguishable is party identification 
from vote intention? How much does the often-remarked volatility in 
panel studies of individual self-placement on the Michigan "seven point 
scale" from strong Democrat through independent to strong Republican 
undermine the notion that party identification is a stable "long term 
force?" Is it clear that the "core" electorates in local, state, and 
national contests overlap completely? Or might different people, or 
the same people at different stages in the life cycle, perceive that 
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they have more of a stake in elections at one level than in those at 
another and therefore participate at different rates in different sorts 
of elections? Indeed, one would have expected the ethnocultural 
school's view that local and state elections in the nineteenth century 
mattered more to the voters than national ones did to lead to a 
rejection of the concept of a constant core electorate. Finally, are 
the belief systems of the voters as incoherent as Phillip E. Converse 
contended in his famous 1964 article, or are voters' constructs simply 
different from what some political scientists expected and more 
dependent than they once realized on the clarity of the choices offered 
by elites?! What model best explains the voter's decision process--a 
socially deterministic one (e. g. , ethnocultural) , one focusing on party 
and personality (e. g. , the American �), or a theory which assumes 
that the voter maximizes or minimaxes on the basis of his preferences 
and the options open to him (rational choice theory)? By drawing 
attention to the actions of candidates and political workers, the 
latter approach casts a different light on the history of American 
electoral participation than Kleppner and Burnham do,2 
Like Michigan's, Kleppner's concepts derive primarily from social 
psychology or sociology, In this work, for instance, he explains the 
decline in northern turnout after 1896 primarily as a result of a 
change in the correlation between two "long term forces"--religion and 
the political parties, Before that date, the Democrats and Republicans 
were, he believes, little more than other names for sets of socially 
competitive liturgical and pietistic ethnoreligious groups. In the new 
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century, he argues, primarily from the book's crucial table (p.78), 
which gives estimates of voting by members of each party in four 
probably unrepresentative referenda on prohibition, ethnocultural 
allegiances did not map one-to-one into partisanship. How members of 
each circle first came to define other camps as "negative reference 
groups," how their conflict persisted so long in such a geographically 
mobile, not very ethnically segregated society as white America has 
always been, and how the national issues of the tariff, economic 
development, inflation, antislavery, and Reconstruction meshed with 
these locally-oriented conflicts, he never satisfactorily explains in 
this or other works. 
Nor is it clear how the numerous and sporadically powerful 
nineteenth century third parties, which Kleppner has treated 
insightfully elsewhere, fit his present scheme, for they surely muddled 
the relationships between the major parties and ethnic, religious, or 
economic groupings. Furthermore, if it was ethnoreligious issues on 
the local or national levels which brought voters to the polls, there 
was plenty to stimulate them after the turn of the century. Positive 
government and piety in politics reached post-Reconstruction highs in 
the 1900-20 period, "Progressive Era" battles over liquor or "boss 
rule" or "Americanization" often pitted ethnic groups against each 
other, and Republicans usually continued after 1896 to be identified 
with prohibition, while "wets" generally found nonsouthern Democrats 
more responsive to their cause. Kleppner's contrast between tightly 
linked social and partisan systems before 1896 and loosely associated 
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ones thereafter seems too overdrawn to sustain the interpretive weight 
which he puts on it. 
Kleppner also exaggerates the importance of another favorite 
sociological notion, that of generational change. In order to estimate 
age cohort differences in turnout during the 1900s and 1930s, he makes 
the crucial, unexamined assumption that older people continued to 
participate in the same proportions that they had previously, and that 
young people just entering the electorate were responsible for all the 
gross turnout changes which took place (pp.68-69, 90-91). Voters, on 
this account, are so strongly socialized into their habits that only 
the turnover of generations can alter the political landscape. Yet 
Kleppner as well as Burnham also adopts V.o. Key's belief that people 
are more likely to vote in ci
'ose elections than in one-sided ones. 
Since this view implies that the masses or at least campaign workers, 
who presumably work harder to turn out votes in tight contests than 
they do in runaways, are rational calculators who alter their behavior 
with political conditions, it seems incompatible with the assumption 
that voters never break their habitual patterns. 
Burnham's Marxist functionalism has never been more apparent than 
in this book. "The state is primarily in business to promote capital 
accumulation and to maintain social harmony and legitimacy." (p.256) 
Critical realignment serves as "America's surrogate for revolution." 
(p.101) The political "system of 1896" had the "function" of 
insulating industrial elites from attacks from below. (pp.97, 110, 142) 
There will be little change in American politics in the 1980s "unless 
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or until the survival needs of the dominant mode of production require 
it." (p.264) All the familiar difficulties with functional 
explanations arise here. Vague in their mechanics and statements, 
functional interpretations are hopelessly deterministic, difficult, if 
not impossible to falsify, and confuse effects with causes. Most 
importantly, the roles of individual actors are unclear. Who speaks 
for capitalism's needs, and how directly need these representatives of 
the bourgeoisie be responsible for the changes for such an explanation 
to be accepted? 
In any case, both Burnham's and Kleppner's books--as well as those 
of many others--stand as refutations to Robert Berkhofer's contention 
that social scientific histories are politically conservative.3 Both, 
for instance, quote the same statement from Gramsci (Burnham, p. 14, 
Kleppner, P• 112), and neither views the course of American political 
history as necessarily desirable or the state as neutral. Burnham, for 
instance, refers to twentieth century American electoral politics as "a 
history of excluded political alternatives" (p. 17), 
Each of these scholars leans toward the behavioral side on the 
question of whether legal or behavioral changes primarily account for 
differences in northern turnout over time and between areas. (Both 
concede that suffrage laws have mattered more in the South.) They 
conclude that the institution of registration laws explains 20-40% of 
the post-1896 decline in participation and they acknowledge but 
minimize the effect of woman suffrage in depressing measured turnout. 
Although Kleppner notes the passage in various non-southern states of 
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literacy tests, secret ballot provisions, laws ending alien suffrage 
and those establishing direct primaries and prohibiting candidates from 
running simultaneously under two different parties' labels, neither he 
nor Burnham tries to determine the combined effects of these with 
registration and residency laws, nor do they attempt to assess possible 
interactions between legal and behavioral changes. (Kleppner, pp. 58-60, 
66, 87; Burnham, pp. 71, 75, 78, 125, 139-40, 155, 169.) Such 
interactions were probably particularly important in reshaping the 
political universes of campaign workers in all parties and potential 
candidates of minority parties, whose actions in turn crucially 
affected the rate of participation by the masses. Instead, Burnham and 
Kleppner estimate the impact of registration laws and the 
enfranchisement of females separately and the other laws not at all, 
and they assign all residual changes in turnout to the behavioral 
category. An inadequate research design and a false (because absolute) 
dichotomy between institutional and behavioral causes undercuts 
Burnham's assertion that "behavioral rather than statutory change was 
the crucially important development in the evolution of the American 
electorate from 1900 to 1940 , , ," (p. 75), 
Although he has played a central role in collecting and making 
available county level election returns for the whole country and in 
popularizing the uncomplicated analysis of time series in electoral 
research, Burnham has never fully exploited this data nor employed the 
more sophisticated methods for teasing meaning out of series developed 
by statisticians and econometricians, While admiring his ingenuity and 
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the suggestiveness of his analyses, readers must be frustrated at 
Burnham's repeated tendency to be satisfied with "preliminary 
overview[s]" (p. 187) and to examine the data from only a few areas or 
at too aggregated a level (e. g. , p. 220), 
A clever data analyst himself, Kleppner is more thorough than 
Burnham, often making use of county level data for the whole country, 
and he relies somewhat more heavily than Burnham does on multiple 
regression. Indeed, this is by far Kleppner's most methodologically 
sophisticated work. One's frustration with Kleppner, rather, arises 
from his insufficient explanation of his often quite peculiar choices 
of variables and specifications of equations and from his tendency to 
fall back on "eyeball" techniques and to discard or undercut his own 
results from fancier methods when the outcomes of such procedures do 
not support his preconceived notions (e.g. , PP• 26-27, 43, 57, 73, 
184). 
Since he believes that political interest in the nineteenth 
century centered on state and local issues, it seems odd that Kleppner 
almost always uses data from presidential and congressional returns. 
Often held on different dates in that period, state and national 
contests may have involved somewhat different sets of electors. 
Second, Kleppner generally divides his data into three regional 
groupings by state ("metropole, 11 "periphery," and "border"), but does 
not justify these groupings theoretically or, apparently, shift them 
over time. Why should voters in the census category "East North 
Central" behave differently from those in the "West North Central"? 
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Should citizens of Maine and Vermont really be classed with those of 
New York City? Are Angelenos and denizens of the San Francisco Bay 
Area as parochial in the 1980s as they were in the 1880s, or should 
they now be classed in the "metropole"? Third, why does Kleppner not 
just include all of what he believes are important independent 
variables in his equations, instead of confusingly running regressions 
using subsets of variables (e.g., tables 4.3,  4.5, 5.3, and 5.7)? 
Fourth, does his "under 2111 variable really reflect the proportion of 
young voters in the electorate, since few under 2 1  could vote, or is it 
not in fact an indication of the middle aged, who were more likely than 
the young to have children in this age range? Likewise, does his proxy 
for education--the proportion of those aged from 5 or 6 to 20 who were 
enrolled in common schools--adequately capture the educational levels 
of those over 21? Fifth, Kleppner's theory relates competition between 
the parties not to gross religiosity, but to membership in competing 
ethnoreligious groups. Why, then, in his ambitious attempts to use 
path analysis to model the connections between religion, party 
competition, and turnout before and after 1900 (tables 3.4 and 4.9) 
does he use the percentage belonging to all churches as his basic 
indicator of societal effects? Why does he not include other 
potentially important societal determinants of turnout, such as wealth, 
in these models? Why does he merge figures from five presidential 
elections in the first table and seven in the second, instead of 
testing whether the parameter values of the model differ from election 
to election? Why does he conclude that religious membership underlay 
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the 1876-92 turnout pattern when, by his chosen standard of statistical 
significance, only 7 of 18 path coefficients for northern sub-regions 
are significant, and three of those are not in the predicted direction? 
The tendency to seek deep meanings in evanescent happenings is the 
seemingly unavoidable occupational hazard of the commentator on current 
politics. Few perform the role of pundit more sensitively and none, 
with a more comprehensive knowledge of American electoral history than 
Dean Burnham does. Yet while at times he underlines the election­
specific nature of political outcomes, as in his recognition that the 
1980 election reflected primarily "a vote of no confidence in an 
incumbent administration which had stumbled into an inchoate economic 
conservatism" (p. 289), he perhaps more often characterizes the 
conditions produced by sequences of such events in such orotund phrases 
as "a generalized crisis of legitimacy" (p. 260) . To what extent is 
the decline in northern turnout since 1960 the product of some sort of 
fundamental transformation of society or politics and to what degree is 
it, on the contrary, the result of transient factors? 
Some curious paradoxes parallel the increasing class participation 
gap. First, there are apparently few systematic differences on 
political issues between voters and nonvoters (Burnham, pp. 169-70) . 
If this is true, then nonvoters may be satisfied to let others who hold 
the same views represent them in the electorate. Under these 
conditions, no crisis of legitimacy or representation exists unless the 
nonvoters' consciousness is deemed false. Second, turnout declined at 
15 
the same time that federal redistributive programs were first growing, 
then becoming institutionalized (up to 1980) , and when partisan 
disagreements in Congress and in many state legislatures were becoming 
more pronounced. As the government's role made more of a difference to 
lower-class voters and as the parties offered starker choices, the 
lower strata, ceterie paribus, should have become more, not less 
active. What other things weren't equsl? Third, even though 
Democratic presidents have, as Burnham charges, moved rightward, and 
even though the increased polarization of party elites would seem to 
have been caused by a dramatic Republican shift to the political right, 
there were larger issue differences in 1981 in California between 
Democratic activists and the masses of Democrats than between 
Republican activists and either Republican or Democratic masses 
(Burnham, pp. 197-99) . These facts suggest that it is not to the 
voters or to the lower party elites, but to the presidential 
candidates, successful and unsuccessful, that we should look for clues 
to the turnout decrease. 
The Democrats have had an unusually bad string of luck--two 
Kennedys assassinated when their nominations seemed highly probable, 
and one, who otherwise would surely have been nominated, besmirched by 
scandal; two incompetent outsider candidates, McGovern and Carter; 
another president who practiced the military anticommunism which most of 
his predecessors and successors have been content just to preach. 
Would participation have sputtered so if the Democrats had nominated a 
publicly untainted Kennedy in any election between 1968 and 1980, if 
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Johnson had carried out his 1964 pledge not to "send American boys to 
do the fighting" in Vietnam, if Nixon's dirty tricks had not thrown 
Muskie off track in 1972, if Carter had managed to bring the Iranian 
hostages home in October, 1980? 
Attitudinal correlates of the fall in voting may also be 
transient. In the face of widespread governmental wrongdoing and open 
flouting of the reasoned views of wide sectors of opinion during the 
Indochina War and the Watergate scandals, a decline in the voters' 
sense that their actions can affect general policy and an increase in 
the distrust of leaders seems natural, even healthy. That such 
politically traumatic events should have affected first one party, and 
then the other repelled voters away from both parties into independency 
or away from electoral politics altogether. Is it not likely that the 
Republicans would have achieved long-term majority status if, in 
addition to Vietnam, LBJ had been caught in a Watergate-type scandal, 
or, conversely, that the Democrats would have if Nixon had been elected 
in 1960 and 1964, had followed the same policies in Southeast Asia as 
Kennedy and Johnson did, and had been caught in something like 
Watergate? 
The French Annalee school has long disdained politics as the mere 
"history of events, " preferring to concentrate on longer-term economic 
and demographic structures. Although American social scientific 
political history is in no danger of becoming lost in the longue duree, 
the increasing and otherwise admirable tendency to see through campaign 
triviality to more fundamental, less rapidly changing factors should 
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not bias us so much as it often does, in these and other books, towards 
downplaying at least the combined effects of seemingly superficial 
events. The new political history has not yet absorbed all the useful 
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